The following article appears today on the front page of the Wall Street Journal and features the 1-14 CAV, 3/2 SBCT. The link will only remain active for 7 days, so be sure to copy/paste the text if you want to keep a copy. Thanks to Jim for the heads-up.
By GREG JAFFE, Wall Street Journal
BAGHDAD, Iraq -- The lower-middle-class neighborhoods that Lt. Col. Jeff Peterson's troops patrol have been the epicenter of Iraq's civil war for most of the past year. "Every issue facing Baghdad writ large is in our area," he says.
In recent weeks, Col. Peterson has tried a controversial approach to calming his sector. As Sunnis and Shiites have separated into their own neighborhoods, he has resisted the urge to encourage reconciliation or even dialogue. Instead, he has erected massive concrete barriers between the sects.
His vision is for a series of small, homogenous, gated communities, each consisting of a two-block square. Each would be built around a market, a mosque and a generator. "The goal is to provide the neighborhoods with a chance to protect themselves, without having to rely on coalition forces, the Iraqi government or the militias," he says.
How he got to that point -- after months of bloodshed and failed experiments -- illustrates a lot about both the possibilities and limitations of the U.S. vision for Iraq.
Currently, the U.S. strategy for stabilizing Iraq is built around getting Iraqis to reconcile and support the democratically elected, Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. It's a classic approach to fighting an insurgency, in which an outside power works to strengthen a friendly, albeit weak, government. The hope is that with help, the government will eventually win the backing of the people by providing security and meeting essential needs. Once insurgents are cut off from support among the population, they will be relatively easy to crush. That's the premise of President Bush's surge strategy, built around bolstering support for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government.
The problem, say some commanders, is that they aren't fighting an insurgency in Iraq anymore. Today, they are trying to stop a civil war between feuding Sunnis and Shiites. "At times I have been tempted to call it a counter-civil war or counter-sectarian fight," Col. Peterson says.
This isn't just an academic point. In a civil war, building up the government and its security forces may be counterproductive, serving only to ratchet up the killing. Defusing a civil war depends on stopping everyone from fighting.
"If you are given the mission to stop hatred, how do you do that?" asks Brig. Gen. John Campbell, an assistant commander overseeing all U.S. forces in Baghdad.
The difficult mission has led military officials to try some unusual tactics. In an effort to reduce retaliatory attacks on locals, some U.S. commanders say they will hold off raiding a Sunni insurgent cell until they have intelligence on a Shiite cell of equal size in an adjoining neighborhood. U.S. commanders have even coined a new term for this tactic: "balanced targeting." [...]
This is just the first section of a very long article.
Comments For "In Iraq, an Officer's Answer To Violence: Build a Wall":
`The problem, say some commanders, is that they aren't fighting an insurgency in Iraq anymore. Today, they are trying to stop a civil war between feuding Sunnis and Shiites. "At times I have been tempted to call it a counter-civil war or counter-sectarian fight," Col. Peterson says.`
Well, if our troops were unprepared to execute a counterinsurgency campaign, how much more unprepared are they for a "counter-civil war or counter-sectarian" fight? In all of military history, is there any example of such a campaign that didn't lead to bleeding the occupation army dry?
Posted by: currahee
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April 5, 2007 11:27 PM