Stryker Brigade News

"The Transformation of Military Logistics from Supply-Point Based to Distribution Based Logistics at the Brigade Level"

Captain Trenton J. Conner
Commander, Company A (Distribution)
25th Brigade Support Battalion
1st Brigade (SBCT), 25th Infantry Division

Abstract

This paper is a comparative analysis on the efficacy differences of a supply based logistics system and that of a distribution based logistics system as it relates to logistics support at the Brigade level. This study compares the differences in structure, logistics flow, and management systems of the Headquarters and Supply Company of a Light Forward Support Battalion and the Distribution Company of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). Highlighted are the benefits of centralized management of transportation assets and the use of digital enablers to increase situational awareness of logistics systems and data by the SBCT. The SBCT has demonstrated in training and in Operation Iraqi Freedom that the move to a distribution based logistics system Army-wide should be at the forefront of the total Army Transformation.

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last decade, the military and especially the Army, has looked at ways to improve its logistics system and ensure continued success on the battlefield. One of the directions the Army has moved is to go from a supply based system to a distribution based logistics system. One of the conduits for testing this system has been using the development of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) to see if distribution based logistics will work at the tactical level. This paper covers many of the lessons learned from these tests over the past two years and in practice in two rotations of SBCTs through Operation Iraqi Freedom.

RELATED LITERATURE

Since the end of the Cold War and the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Army in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States Army has looked to find ways to transform itself into a more rapidly deployable and mobile force in order to deal more effectively with the asymmetric threats facing the country in the form of an ever increasing number of terrorists organizations (IBCT O & O, 2000). However, in order for the Army to transform the way it executes combat operations, the Army had to change the way its logistics operations were structured. “There will never be a revolution in military affairs until there is a revolution in military logistics,” said then Army Chief of Staff, GEN Dennis J. Reimer in a 1999 article published in the Army Logistician. The Revolution in Military Logistics started in the mid-1990’s and is continuing to this day.

The Revolution in Military Logistics represents the transformation of the Army logistics system to a distribution-based logistics (DBL) system. DBL is a seamless logistics system that is integrated and synchronized to meet demand at the time of need. The RML is composed of five basic components:

• A reduction in the demand that results from more supportable and reliable weapon systems.


• More accurate and timely visibility of demands.


• Quicker and more responsive processes.


• Increased support from afar.


• A reduction of the sustainment footprint on the battlefield.

In Army of Excellence Units (AOE) or Legacy Forces, the unit tasked to provide supply support to maneuver brigades is the Supply Company within a Forward Support Battalion (FSB). The Supply Company within light forces, those forces that move primarily by foot or helicopter, is the Headquarters and Supply Company. It is called this because the battalion headquarters and the Supply Platoon are organic to the company. This company provides supply point distribution of food, personal equipment, packaged POL, fuel, barrier materials, and ammunition and operates a Supply Support Activity or “warehouse” (FM 63-20, 1990). The Forward Maintenance Company provides repair parts supply support with the operation of a separate Supply Support Activity. Supplies are physically distributed from these separate supply points by transportation assets located within the Support Platoons of each of the maneuver battalions within the Brigade.

In 1999, Army Chief of Staff, GEN Eric J. Shinseki called for the Transformation of the Army. He called for the creation of an Interim Force that would lead the transformation effort and bridge the gap between Legacy Forces and the Future Force. This Interim Force eventually became known as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) because it was built around a new combat vehicle called the Stryker. The Stryker is a multi-variant vehicle that primarily performs the mission of moving infantry soldiers rapidly throughout varying terrain and provides supporting fires to dismounted soldiers. The support battalion created within the SBCT is the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and is composed of three companies: the Distribution Company, the Forward Maintenance Company, and the Brigade Support Medical Company (FM 4-93.7, 2001). The remainder of this paper will look at the differences between the AOE Headquarters and Supply Company and the Distribution Company in relation to the overall RML and the key differences in organizational structure, the channels of requisition and physical distribution, and the differences in logistics management systems.

The transformation the Army is currently going through is leading to the creation of the Future Force. This Future Force is composed of self-sustaining Units of Action, which are modular units capable of conducting operations throughout the spectrum of warfare. According to the current Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, and his Army Campaign Plan these, units will be capable of conducting independent action as part of both Joint and Expeditionary operations (AUSA, 2004). The “self-sustaining” piece of Unit of Action capabilities is where distribution based logistics will provide feasible solutions to complex logistics requirements.

METHODOLOGY

This paper is a comparative analysis between the logistics systems of an Army of Excellence Light Brigade with supporting Headquarters and Supply Company and that of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team with its Distribution Company. It will attempt to determine efficacy differences in supporting Warfighters conducting combat operations. The criteria being used to compare the two types of units are three fold:

• Organizational Structure and Capabilities


• The Channels of Requisition and Physical Distribution


• Logistics Management Systems

The comparative tools used to complete the analysis exist in doctrine, collections of historical data, and lessons learned throughout the conduct of Combat Training Center Rotations and recent deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

FINDINGS

Organizational structure

The mission of the Headquarters and Supply Company (HSC) is to provide multi-class supply support to a light infantry brigade. It provides all classes of supply through its operation of a Supply Support Activity (SSA), minus repair parts (IX) and medical supplies (VIII). These two supply capabilities rest within the Maintenance Company, who operates a separate SSA, and the Medical Company, whose logistics system is completely different than the other two and falls outside the scope of this discussion (SPO, 2004). Supplies are distributed via supply point distribution at various locations within a Brigade Support Area. Each of these supply points are specific to one commodity and are normally laid out in unit piles when appropriate. The customer units are required to come to each of these supply points to draw their required supplies upon notification of their availability.

The Battalion Field Trains and Company Combat Trains, units outside the support battalion, accomplish the physical distribution of supplies because the HSC has no direct support transportation assets. The Field Trains are typically located in their command post within the Brigade Support Area and is composed of a Support Platoon that has limited transportation assets. These trucks move from supply point to supply point and draw their battalion’s supply requirements and then muster to form a logistics convoy. These logistics convoys move from the Field Trains Command Post forward (in a linear fight) to the Combat Trains Command Post. The Combat Trains Command Post is composed of three separate company level transportation assets usually only one or two 2 ½ ton trucks each. Each supported battalion’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander, an Infantry Officer, manages the Field Trains Command Post and the battalion’s logistics officer, also an Infantry Officer, manages the Combat Trains Command Post.

This design causes three separate units to provide supply support to the brigade and creates a multitude of supply points that must be managed as separate entities by logistics managers within the support battalion. Also by design, there are three separate organizations involved with the physical distribution of one unit’s supplies within the brigade area, two of which are not logistics units. This creates longer lead times for units requiring support.

With Army Transformation came the advent of the Brigade Support Battalion and a completely new type of Quartermaster Company called the Distribution Company. The creation of this company called for the elimination of field trains moving almost all brigade transportation assets within its control; Stryker companies did retain two 5-ton cargo trucks for internal lift and had the added benefit of MHE crane assemblies mounted on the back. The Distribution Company provides for the physical distribution of all supplies, minus medical, to the SBCT. The company’s Supply Platoon operates a multi-class Forward Distribution Point, formerly Supply Support Activity, and the SBCT’s Ammunition Transfer and Holding Point. The Supply Platoon is responsible for the receipt and cross docking of supplies. The Transportation Platoon, with its 20 Load-Handling System trucks and standardized Container Roll-off Platforms, provides the physical distribution of these supplies to battalion and sometimes company areas. The Fuel and Water Platoon provides the receipt and retail issue of bulk fuel and water to battalion areas. All of these activities eliminate the need for maneuver units to come to the Brigade Support Area to draw supplies.

With this major shift in logistics capabilities to the support battalion, specifically the Distribution Company, maneuver units no longer need to focus as much attention to their logistics needs and are able to focus more on their primary mission of conducting combat operations. This shift of capabilities also leads to reduced inventory costs and shorter lead times as proven by the reduction of over $200,000 in inventory costs by the 1/25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team in August 2004. The Distribution Company is the sole provider of the entire Brigade’s supply and distribution needs and by design is less complicated to manage.

Logistics flow-Requisition and Distribution

One of the key drivers of lead time or in Army speak “Customer Wait Time (CWT)” is the time it takes for a unit’s supply requisition to be processed and transmitted to higher sources of supply. The other key driver of CWT is the amount of time it takes for that requisition to be fulfilled and delivered to the customer. This section looks at the efficacy differences in these two drivers of CWT in the Legacy Brigade and the SBCT.

In a Legacy Brigade, requisitions for supplies are submitted by company supply personnel via disks from their User Level Logistics Systems or manual forms to their supporting Supply Support Activity, pending the type item of supply required. These disks or forms must travel throughout the brigade area by currier and pass through the multiple nodes described earlier (FM 63-20, 1990). The SSA clerk processes requisitions either electronically or manually once they arrive at the Supply Support Activity (SSA). The computer system (SARSS 1) then determines whether or not the SSA can fulfill this requisition from on-hand stocks or if it must be passed to a higher source of supply, whether it be a reinforcing divisional or non-divisional supply company or all the way up to a theater or national level asset. This is one method of requisition.

The other method of requisition is the compilation of a brigade-level logistics status report or LOGSTAT. The LOGSTAT reports the current supply posture of the brigade and the future requirements for the next three days, and is a compilation of battalion-level LOGSTATs derived from three to four company-level logistics status reports. The Brigade LOGSTAT report is submitted to a Divisional Material Management Center, who in turn, directs the supporting Forward Support Battalion to issue the requirements at the time of need by issuing a Material Release Order. Usually, this Brigade LOGSTAT is courtesy copied to the Forward Support Battalion so they can prepare to issue the available items to their customers.

Both of these methods take anywhere from 24-48 hours to accomplish depending on the type of operations the brigade is conducting. There are many potential problems with the first method. Paper and diskettes are subject to loss, damage, and destruction in field environments. Requisitions may have to be repeated multiple times until successfully inputted into the Supply Support Activity’s computer system. Another factor leading to increases in the CWT is that requisitions are for single line items. That is each unit must order one particular type of item in varying quantities at a time. The orders are then compiled in SARSS 1 and submitted to higher sources of supply as a single requisition. Supply based logistics does provide for greater amounts of stocks to be on hand and increases the availability of commonly requested items.

The SBCT requisition systems leverages new technologies to overcome the cumbersome methods just discussed. Technologies such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), tactical internets, and Movement Tracking Systems (MTS) allow for the real-time collecting and passing of supply requirements from the user all the way up to the brigade level and the ability to track the movements of supplies across the battlefield (FM 4-93.7, 2001). Although the Army has yet to field updated supply computer systems, supply personnel can post data from their User Level Logistics Systems on the tactical internet allowing personnel from the Forward Distribution Point to download data files into SARSS 1. LOGSTAT reports are compiled and transmitted to logistics planners via FBCB2 and requisitions are continuously sent up through the supply chain.

The SBCT achieves several benefits from its unique Distribution Base Logistics system. First, it operates using configured loads (CLs). Configured Loads are commodity and unit specific pre-configured pallets of supplies designed to fit onto the Container Roll-off Platforms. These CLs provide units a known quantity of supplies based on the size of the unit and known consumption data. Configured loads are either depot packed or configured by higher sources of supply and shipped to the Distribution Company for delivery to customers. This allows for minimal handling at the FDP, increases velocity through the supply chain, and reduces inventory costs. The use of digital enablers increases the reliability of supply data and the use of MTS allows in-transit visibility of unit supplies. The drawbacks to these systems are that personnel must receive additional training in the use of these systems and they are limited to the signal architecture of the brigade.

In regards to the physical distribution process, both supply base and distribution based systems are similar in concept. The key difference between the two is the flexibility gained by the centralization of assets within the Distribution Company. In a legacy force, the respective battalion headquarters controls the transportation assets found in its Support Platoon. These units are tasked as they see fit and are synchronized with that battalion’s operations but not the Brigade’s overall logistics plan. Consequently, Support Platoons may be tasked to conduct separate operations, such as security or other force protection activities, when supplies are ready for pick up at the Supply Support Activity. In the SBCT, almost all transportation assets are part of the Distribution Company and their operations are synchronized with the SBCT’s operations. This allows the logistics managers to flex assets as priorities change and also ensures the protection of critical support assets. Normally, each battalion receives supplies on an every two or three-day basis based on consumption data. If an emergency situation develops, the Distribution Company can quickly react to meet the need. The Distribution Company demonstrated its unique flexibility during 1/25th SBCT’s Certification Exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center by positioning direct support assets forward to assist battalion logistics managers in the transport of supplies, leveraging non-committed transportation assets against downstream requirements (CALL, 2004). Also, as reported by the supporting Corps Material Management Center in October 2004, the Distribution Company of the 1/25th Stryker Brigade reduced Customer Wait Times by an average of four days within the first month of combat operations in Iraq. Contributing to this decrease was the effective use of materials handling capabilities and streamlining of receiving and cross-docking processes.

Management Systems

One of the most revolutionary transformations that have taken place within the SBCT is the streamlining of logistics management functions within the brigade area. The creation of the Support Operations/Distribution Management Center (SPO/DMC) has led to focused, flexible, and tailored distribution based logistics support for the SBCT (FM 4-93.7, 2001). The material management and movement control functions found within Legacy Force divisions is now at the brigade level leading to increased efficiencies in synchronization and demand management.

In Legacy divisions, supply management and transportation requirements are managed separately. The Material Management Center is responsible for compiling each brigade’s requirements and demand histories and ensuring the right stocks are on-hand to meet these demands. The required movements of these supplies are then tasked to transportation units and these movements fall under a separate office called the Movement Control Office (SPO, 2004). At the brigade level, once supplies are on-hand at the various supply points, the customer unit is notified and it is the responsibility of the customer to conduct a separate movement to the Brigade Support Area to pick them up and deliver to the final customer. In this supply chain there are multiple nodes managed by multiple people. These nodes also fall under the supervision of multiple units with their own priorities and needs. Many times these priorities compete against each other and cause friction between units. This method of acquiring and moving supplies through the battle space requires meticulous coordination to meet the demands of customers.

In the SBCT, the material management and movement control functions are combined. Battalion-level logistics managers forecast their requirements and provide them directly to the SPO/DMC. The SPO/DMC then synchronizes the delivery of supplies and produces a Distribution Matrix and provides this to the Distribution Company Commander (MTP, 2002). The Distribution Matrix is a living document and requires updates every 24-48 hours depending on changes to brigade operations. The Distribution Matrix is also provided to the Brigade Logistics Manager (S4) so that it is synchronized with brigade operations. The Distribution Company executes these missions and reports completion to the SPO via FBCB2 and MTS allows the SPO to maintain in-transit visibility.

CONCLUSION

As the Army continues to revolutionize the way it supports the warfighter, there are many valuable lessons to be learned from the SBCT. Distribution Based Logistics has proven to be a leaner, more effective way to supply the force. Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, two SBCTs have proven that even at the end of a long supply chain, austere though efficient distribution companies can meet the multiple needs of its customers by leveraging digital enablers and synchronizing the use of available assets. Maneuver commanders have gained understanding that supplies do not have to be physically present all the time to be received when they are needed. The pipeline has become the Army’s warehouse leading to decreases in inventory levels and taxpayer costs.

Where are we headed? Over the next several years as Units of Action, new modular-based brigade-size organizations, are organized and replace existing brigades, the Army will continue to expand its digital capability. There are projects underway to replace the aging User Level Logistics Systems and other supporting Standard Army Management Information Systems. These new systems will link the aforementioned technologies and provide warfighters and logistics managers alike with the most up to date logistics information and provide real-time asset visibility. Also, digital enablers will be fielded to all units and not just those at the forefront of testing and experimentation. The SBCT has proven to be the bridge between the Legacy Force and the Future Force and as even more data is collected as the next four SBCTs complete the Transformation process, more lessons will be learned and integrated into the Future Force.

References

Association of the United States Army (2004). Army, Green Book 2004-2005.

Center of Army Lessons Learned (2004). Initial Impressions Report, JRTC 04-05 SBCT 2.

Combined Arms Support Command (2004). ALM 69-6932-HB-G, Support Operations Handbook, Version G.

Headquarters Department of the Army (2001). FM 4-93.7, Combat Service Support to the IBCT.

Headquarters Department of the Army (2003). FM 4-20, Quartermaster Principals.

Headquarters Department of the Army (1990). FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion.

Headquarters Department of the Army (2002). Mission Training Plan, Distribution Company, Brigade Support Battalion, Interim Brigade Combat Team.

Headquarters Department of the Army (2000). The Interim Brigade Combat Team, Organizational and Operational Concept.