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Can Petraeus Salvage Iraq?

Jun-21-2004 » Filed Under: Iraq News

Ok, the title of the article is a bit dramatic, but it contains some interesting information about the development of the Iraqi security forces.

[Link to Full Article]
By BY VIVIENNE WALT / BAGHDAD

Lieutenant General David Petraeus has just returned to his office in Baghdad's Republican Palace from visiting a close friend — a tribal sheikh he had come to know well during his 10-month command of the 101st Airborne Division in the northern city of Mosul. As is often the case, Petraeus is one lucky man: His friend, Sheikh Ghazi Yawar, was appointed as Iraq's new president three weeks ago. And Yawar's most critical priority is the one Petraeus is now charged with overseeing: getting Iraq's military and police forces up and running. "It was wonderful to see him," gushes the 51-year-old general about his friend from Mosul. Another key relationship could be about to pay off big.

Petraeus will need all the friends he can garner once Iraq's sovereignty is transferred to Yawar's government on July 1. Barely three months after Petraeus returned home to Cornwall, N.Y. after a year's command in Iraq, President Bush sent the general back to Baghdad in late April to help salvage a mission that was turning into a mounting political disaster for Washington. [...]

Within weeks of that visit, Petraeus was back again, this time with a clear mandate to stay as long as it takes to fix the under-equipped, underpaid, and demoralized Iraqi security forces. "The President told me I could have anything I wanted, and I took him at his word," Petraeus told TIME during an hour-long interview this week in his office. As an economist with a doctorate from Princeton, Petraeus knew what he needed: Money, lots of it, and fast. During 14 months of occupation, U.S. forces had made several attempts to kick-start Iraq's military. Many had faltered over financial issues: At one stage last year, hundreds of new military recruits went AWOL after learning that their monthly pay was well below that of regular police officers. Others quit after determining that there was barely a corner of Iraq in which they were not prime targets for assassination — and that they were a lot more poorly equipped than their foes.

(via Drezner)


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